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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Amber Round appeals from the district court's Order Suspending Sentence and 
Order of Probation. She asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of her right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Complaint alleging that Amber Round had committed the crime 
of possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.8-9.) A preliminary hearing was held, 
Ms. Round was bound over into the district court, and an Information was filed charging 
her with the above crime. (R., pp.26-34; Tr. Prelim.)1 Ms. Round filed a Motion to 
Suppress and a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R., pp.52-
57, 67-98.) She asserted that the evidence gathered against her should be suppressed 
for two reasons: First, her initial warrantless detention was not justified by reasonable, 
articulable suspicion; Second, even if her initial detention was lawful, her detention was 
unlawfully extended without further justification. (R., pp.67-98.) The State filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Ms. Round's motion to suppress and hearing was held on 
Ms. Round's motion. (R., pp.99-126; Tr. 2/22/10.) 
The district court made the following factual findings: 
1 The Preliminary Hearing transcripts are included in the appellate record in the 
electronic record "38963 State v. Round Preliminary Trans." 
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1. On the evening of August 10, 2009, Officer Montoya and Detective 
Holtry assisted other officers in the detention and arrest of an individual 
named Alfredo Ybarra for possession of ten ounces of 
methamphetamine. 
2. One of the vehicles involved was a white Ford Explorer which was 
parked in a lot by the Boise Little Theater in Boise City, Ada County, 
Idaho. 
3. A drug detection dog alerted on this vehicle and a search revealed a 
baggy of methamphetamine and a gun and clip. 
4. Office Montoya contacted Detective Christensen concerning the 
Explorer somewhere between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on the morning of 
August 11, 2009. 
5. Because the officers involved were not sure what action to take, it was 
left there overnight. 
6. Later in the morning of August 11, between 7:10 and 7:15 a.m., 
Detectives Holtry and Christensen checked on the Explorer. 
7. A black Nissan Exterra was about ten to fifteen feet away from the 
Explorer and a person Detective Holtry recognized from contact the 
previous evening as Michael Stolp was reaching inside the Explorer. 
8. Detective Holtry approached Michael Stolp and Detective Christensen 
drove after the Exterra which had headed down the alley. 
9. Detective Holtry called for the assistance of uniformed officers and a 
drug detection dog. 
10. Detective Christensen initiated a traffic stop to determine the 
involvement of the driver of the Exterra with the Explorer and Michael 
Stolp. 
11. Detective Christensen recognized the driver as Defendant Amber Rae 
Round with whom he had previously had contact. 
12. About a month earlier, she had been frequenting place where 
methamphetamine was being used and he had learned that she was 
involved in using methamphetamine and, perhaps, providing it to 
others. 
13. Detective Christensen approached the Exterra and noted that 
Defendant appeared nervous and agitated. 
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14. He estimated contacting Defendant about 7: 15 a.m. 
15. He discussed his concerns regarding the Explorer and Defendant's 
proximity to it and Defendant responded she was just dropping 
someone off. 
16. Michael Stolp told Detective Holtry he was there to pick up the Explorer 
and Defendant had given him a ride. 
17. Detective Holtry relayed this information to Detective Christensen. 
18. Nonetheless, given Defendant's demeanor and his previous 
experience with her, Detective Christensen felt she had drugs in 
her vehicle. 
19. He asked for Defendant's consent to search the Exterra and she 
initially refused. 
20. Detective Christensen then explained to Defendant his reasons for 
asking permission to search. 
21.At that point, Defendant said she wanted to call her attorney, D.C. 
Carr, and Detective Christensen allowed her to do so. 
22. There is some question as to whether Defendant had previously exited 
her vehicle at the direction of Detective Christensen or did so when 
she was told she could contact Mr. Carr. 
23. Nonetheless, she moved a short distance away from Detective 
Christensen to speak with her attorney on her cell phone. 
24. This was sometime around 7: 15 to 7:20 a.m. 
25. Defendant spoke with Mr. Carr somewhere between five to ten 
minutes. 
26. She then handed the phone to Detective Christensen indicating that 
her attorney wanted to speak with him. 
27. Detective Christensen spoke with Mr. Carr for two to three minutes. 
28. While Defendant was still on the phone with her attorney, Ada County 
Sheriffs Deputy Aaron Teall arrived with his drug detection dog, Nate. 
29. Deputy Teall was directed to deploy Nate. 
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30. They went around the Exterra and, on the first pass, Nate alerted on 
the driver's side of the vehicle. 
31. Deputy Teall then searched the vehicle and found the suspected 
methamphetamine. 
32. Detective Christensen estimated the entire time of his contact with 
Defendant was fifteen to twenty minutes from the stop of Defendant's 
vehicle to her arrest for possession of the methamphetamine. 
(R., pp.148-149.)2 In addition to these facts articulated by the court, Detective 
Christensen testified that when he first made contact with Ms Round he "believe[s]" he 
took her driver's license and registration and "guess[ed]" that he gave them to the officer 
who transported her to jail. (Tr. 2/22/10, p.57, Ls.1-8.) Furthermore, Detective 
Christensen testified that his investigation changed from trying to determine her 
connection with the Explorer to wanting to search her car because he "knew she had 
dope in the vehicle" based upon "her demeanor that day," although she was probably 
nervous on previous contacts as well as most people are nervous when they have 
contact with police. (Tr. 2/22/10, p.59, L.2 - p.60, L.10.) The district court ultimately 
denied Ms. Round's motion to suppress finding that the initial stop was lawful, her 
detention was related to the purpose of the initial stop, and the length of detention was 
no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. (R., pp.147-153.) 
Ms. Round was found guilty as charged after a jury trial. (R., pp.172-189, 220.) 
The district court sentenced her to a unified term of seven years, with two years fixed, to 
run concurrently with unrelated charges, and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.252-
256.) Ms. Round successfully completed her rider and was placed on probation for a 
period of seven years. (R., pp.261-266.) Ms. Round filed a Notice of Appeal timely 
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from the district court's Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. 
(R., pp.267-270.) 
2 The district court provided these findings of fact in a single paragraph. These findings 
have been presented as individually numbered findings herein for ease of reading. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Round's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Round's Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
The district court reached three legal conclusions. First. the court found that 
Ms. Round's detention was justified from its inception. Second, the court found that 
officers did not impermissibly expand the scope of the investigation beyond its initial 
purpose. Finally, the district court found that the duration on the stop was not illegally 
extended. Ms. Round concedes that her initial detention was justified. However, she 
asserts that the length of her detention was impermissibly extended solely to allow a 
drug dog to sniff the exterior of her vehicle, based upon Detective Christensen "hunch" 
that there were drugs in the vehicle, regardless of whether or not the purported purpose 
her seizure had changed. Lacking probable cause and denied consent to search, 
Detective Christensen detained Ms. Round for between 15 and 20 minutes until a drug 
dog arrived and alerted on Ms. Round's vehicle. Detective Christensen violated 
Ms. Round's right to be free from unreasonable seizures protected by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution3; therefore, the district court erred in denying Ms. Round's motion to 
suppress. 
3 Although the attorney who presented and argued Ms. Round's suppression motion 
made a general argument that Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment, no specific argument was made asserting the 
greater protection of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.52-54, 67-98; Tr. 2/22/10.) 
Therefore, Ms. Round will rely upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal. 
7 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review 
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate 
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 
14 7 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). 
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the occupants that implicates the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979). Law enforcement may stop a person for 
a brief, investigatory detention if the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the person stopped is, or is about to be engaged in, criminal activity. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (citations omitted). "The predicate 
permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement 
interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect." Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. "Similarly, 
the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. 
(citations omitted). "It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to 
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and 
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." Id. 
An intrusion into an individual's Fourth Amendment rights cannot be justified 
based upon an officer's mere "hunch" of criminal activity; rather, the facts available at 
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the time of the intrusion must be judged objectively to determine whether there exists a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (citations 
omitted). In analyzing the reasonableness of a seizure based upon less than probable 
cause, the Idaho Court of Appeals has developed a two-part inquiry: First, whether the 
officer's actions were justified at the seizure's inception; second, whether the seizure 
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the seizure. State v. 
Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 
360 (Ct. App. 2000)). "[W]here officers abandon the initial purpose of a routine traffic 
stop4 and extend it to allow for a drug dog search, the extension must be justified by a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Danney, _Idaho _, 
2012 Opinion No. 34, pg.6 (Mar. 1, 2012) (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Round's Motion To Suppress As Her 
Continued Detention Was Not Based Upon An Objectively Reasonable, 
Articulable Suspicion That She Was Engaged In Criminal Activity 
The district court found that "Detective Christensen had a 'particularized and 
objective basis' to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. Therefore, his stop of 
[Ms. Round] was justified." (R, p.150.) Ms. Round concedes her initial detention was 
justified at its inception based upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that she was 
somehow involved with the Ford Explorer, and she recognizes that Detective 
Christiensen could lawfully seize her in order to determine her connection to that car. 
See e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (holding that the temporary 
4 Although Ms. Round was stopped while driving her vehicle, her initial detention was 
not a "routine traffic stop." She was not stopped for any violations of the law; rather, she 
was stopped because she appeared to have some connection with Ford Explorer that 
had been linked to criminal activity the night before. (R, pp.147-149.) 
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detention of individuals found within a home that was the subject of a search warrant, 
for the purpose of determining the individuals' the connection with the home, was not 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).) However, her continued detention in 
order to allow a drug dog to sniff her vehicle was in no way related to determining her 
connection to the Explorer, and was not justified based upon any other particularized 
suspicion of criminal activity. 
1. Ms. Round's Continued Detention For The Purpose Of Allowing A Drug 
Dog To Sniff The Exterior Of Her Vehicle Was Unreasonable, As It Was 
Not Reasonably Related To Any Suspicion That She Was Involved With 
The Criminal Activity Associated With The Explorer 
When Detective Christensen initially approached Ms. Round, she appeared 
neNous and agitated, he informed her that he was investigating her connection to the 
Explorer, and he took her driver's license and vehicle registration. (R., p.148; 
Tr. 2/22/10, p.57, Ls.1-8.) Detective Christensen recognized Ms. Round from an 
interaction he had with her about one month prior, where he believed that she "had 
been involved with a group of subjects using methamphetamine" and he "had 
information that she had provided methamphetamine for people at that location;" 
however, Ms. Round was cited for "frequenting a place of drug use," but not with deliver 
of a controlled substance. (Tr. 2/22/10, p.39, L.4 - p.40, L.1.) When asked about what 
she was doing in the area, Ms. Round informed Detective Christensen that she was just 
dropping off a friend - this information was corroborated by Detective Holtry who relayed 
the same story from Mr. Stolp. (R., p.148.) Ms. Round refused to consent to the search 
of her car and, after Detective Christensen again asked for her consent, she asked to 
call her attorney. (R., p.148.) Prior to her refusal, a drug dog was called to the scene. 
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(R., p.148.) Detective Christensen testified that when he spoke with Mr. Carr, he 
informed him that the drug dog was on its way and that he intended to have the dog 
sniff Ms. Round's vehicle. (Tr. 2/22/10, p.43, Ls.2-24.) 
Detective Christensen's initial inquiry revealed nothing that would suggest to him 
that Ms. Round was involved with the Explorer beyond what both she and Mr. Stolp had 
relayed - that she was just dropping Mr. Stolp off. Ms. Round's previous alleged illegal 
supplying of methamphetamine to those that she was using with, and her nervous, 
agitated state, did nothing to add to any suspicion that she was involved with the illegal 
activities associated with the Explorer from the night before, let alone confirm such 
suspicions. 
The purpose and the length of a warrantless detention must be reviewed in 
conjunction with each other, a detention must last no longer than is necessary to either 
confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions, and the investigative means must be the least 
intrusive means reasonably available. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. Simply put, running a 
drug dog around the exterior of Ms. Round's vehicle is not in any way related to any 
suspicion that she was involved with the criminal activities associated with the Explorer. 
Detective Christensen could not lawfully detain Ms. Round just to pass the time while 
the drug dog was en route, merely because she would not consent to his searching her 
vehicle. There were no facts suggesting to a reasonable person that evidence of 
Ms. Round's connection to the criminal activities associated with the Explorer, would be 
found in her vehicle. Thus, her continued detention could not be based upon this 
justification, was unreasonable and violated Ms. Round's Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable seizures. 
11 
2. Ms. Round's Continued Detention For The Purpose Of Allowing A Drug 
Dog To Sniff The Exterior Of Her Vehicle Was Unreasonable, As 
Detective Christensen Did Not Possess Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion 
That Ms. Round Possessed Drugs In Her Vehicle That Would Justify Her 
Detention 
The district court reasoned that Detective Christensen's request for consent to 
search Ms. Round's vehicle was within the scope of her initial detention as "the stop in 
the case at bar was drug-related from its inception." (R., p.150 (The court distinguishing 
the present case from State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1990).)5 However, 
by his own admission, Detective Christensen shifted his investigation from determining 
Ms. Round's connection to the Explorer, to an investigation into whether Ms. Round 
presently possessed drugs. Regardless of whether reviewed from the standpoint of the 
initial detention, or upon all of the facts known to Detective Christensen during the 
course Ms. Round's detention, this latter investigation was based solely upon a hunch. 
Detective Christensen testified to the following: 
0. What was the specific reason that you decided to go from 
investigating what Ms. Round's reason for being in the area with that 
particular passenger was, wanting to search for narcotics (sic)? 
A. I would say my primary thing was, as soon as I contacted 
Ms. Round, her demeanor. 
0. And she was nervous, you say? 
5 The district court's apparent conclusion that an investigation does not morph merely 
because it involves the same generalized area of the law is curious. For example, an 
officer may lawfully pull a driver over if the car he is driving has a broken headlight. If 
the facts warrant, that stop may morph into an investigation into whether the driver is 
wearing a seatbelt, is driving under the influence, or has committed any other number of 
crimes. However, each investigation must be based upon articulable facts to justify the 
continued detention. A defendant's detention for investigation into driving under the 
influence is not "justified at its inception" because he was driving with a broken 
headlight, although each potential violation of the law is "driving-related." 
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A. I had had several contacts with Ms. Round in the past, and 
her demeanor caused me some concern. 
Q. So your previously contacts had also caused you -
A. No, her demeanor that day. I knew she had to open the 
vehicle. 
Q. I'm sorry. What was that? 
A. I knew she had dope in the vehicle. 
Q. And how did you know that? 
A. I could tell by the way she was acting. 
Q. How may previous contacts had you had with her? 
A. I'm guessing probably five. 
Q. And you had seen her a month before? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. And she had been cited for frequenting? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. And she wasn't nervous then? 
A. I think she was probably a little bit nervous that day. 
Q. And what about your previous contacts? Was she ever 
nervous? 
A. I don't know. People probably get nervous most times when 
they have contact with the police. So yeah, she could have been. 
(Tr. 2/22/10, p.59, L.2 - p.60, L.10.) 
Detective Christensen's description of his suspicion reveals had no more than a 
"hunch" that Ms. Round was possessing methamphetamine, based solely upon "the 
way she was acting." Id. Such a detention is not constitutionally reasonable. Terry v. 
13 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)). By his own 
admission, most people who have contact with the police are nervous - if officers may 
detain a person for the sole purpose of allowing a drug dog to arrive based upon the 
person being nervous, a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, in reality, would be subject to the total discretion of the police. The Fourth 
Amendment's guarantees are not limited by the whim of a governmental agent. 
Additionally, even considering all of the facts known to Detective Christensen at 
the time of his detention of Ms. Round, he did not possess an objectively reasonable 
suspicion that justified her detention in order to allow a drug dog to perform its law 
enforcement duties. Detective Christensen knew that Ms. Round was associated with a 
person looking into a car that had been involved in criminal activity the night before, and 
she had previously been suspected of being involved with the use and delivery of 
methamphetamine (although she had only been charged with frequenting, suggesting 
that there was no probable cause to charge her with actual possession of 
methamphetamine, let alone delivery of a controlled substance). Additionally, she 
refused to consent to the search of her car, and she spoke with her attorney on the 
phone. These facts simply do not supply the reasonable, articulable suspicion 
necessary to justify Ms. Round's continued detention. 
a. Ms. Round's Detention Was Not Extended By Her Phone 
Conversation 
The district court found that Ms. Round's continued detention was caused, in 
large part, by Ms. Round talking to her attorney on the phone. (R., pp.151-152.) The 
court found that there was no showing that Detective Christensen allowed Ms. Round to 
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call her attorney as a delay tactic in order for the drug dog to arrive. Id. The court's 
analysis is irrelevant. Ms. Round was seized the entire time - she was never free to go 
regardless of the way she chose to spend her detention. Detective Christensen seized 
Ms. Round when he seized her driver's license and he never ended the seizure by 
returning the license to her. (Tr. 2/22/10, p.57, Ls.1-8.); See also Royer, 460 U.S. at 
501. Furthermore, Detective Christensen testified that, 
I told [Mr. Carr] that I was in the area and that I had contacted Amber, and 
that we had requested to search her vehicle, and explained to him the 
nature of our contact and told him that we were in fact - had requested a 
drug dog. And as soon as the drug dog arrived on scene and went around 
her vehicle, that we would just go with things after that point. 
{Tr. 2/22/10, p.43, Ls.9-19.) While the district court was undoubtedly correct in finding 
that Detective Christensen did not unlawfully extend the stop under the guise of allowing 
Ms. Round to speak to her attorney, it is equally correct to say that Ms. Round's 
conversation with her attorney did not extend her seizure at all. Detective Christensen 
had a hunch that Ms. Round possessed drugs in her car. He took her license, a drug 
dog was called, and she was detained until the drug dog arrived. Ms. Round's detention 
did not become lawful merely because she was allowed to call her attorney. 
D. The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Round's Motion To Suppress 
For the reasons stated in section l(C) above, Ms. Round asserts that her 
continued detention was unreasonable and, thus, violated her Fourth Amendment and 
Article I § 17 right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Ms. Round 
asserts that the discovery of the evidence used against her was the product of her illegal 
detention and should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong 
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Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). Therefore, Ms. Round asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Round respectfully requests that this Court her conviction, vacate the district 
court's order of judgment and commitment, and reverse the order which denied her 
motion to suppress. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2012. 
fre~~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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